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The Benefi ts of Being a Suicidal Curmudgeon:
Emil Cioran on Killing Yourself
G. M. Trujillo, Jr.
University of Louisville
Abstract: Emil Cioran offers novel arguments against suicide.  He assumes 
a meaningless world.  But in such a world, he argues, suicide and death 
would be equally as meaningless as life or anything else.  Suicide and 
death are as cumbersome and useless as meaning and life.  Yet Cioran 
also argues that we should contemplate suicide to live better lives.  By 
contemplating suicide, we confront the deep suffering inherent in existence. 
This humbles us enough to allow us to change even the deepest aspects of 
ourselves.  Yet it also reminds us that our peculiar human ability—being 
able to contemplate suicide—sets us above anything else in nature or in 
the heavens.  This paper assembles and defends a view of suicide written 
about in Cioran’s aphorisms and essays.
Keywords: Emil Cioran, suicide, ethics, good life, pessimism, French 
philosophy, existentialism
Why don’t I commit suicide?  Because I am as sick of death 
as I am of life.  I should be cast into a fl aming cauldron! Why 
am I on this earth?  I feel the need to cry out, to utter a savage 
scream that will set the world atremble with dread.  I am like a 
lightning bolt ready to set the world ablaze and swallow it all in 
the fl ames of my nothingness.  I am the most monstrous being 
in history, the beast of the apocalypse full of fi re and darkness, 
of aspirations and despair.  I am the beast with a contorted grin, 
contracting down to illusion and dilating toward infi nity, both 
growing and dying, delightfully suspended between hope for 
nothing and despair of everything, brought up among perfumes 
and poisons, consumed with love and hatred, killed by lights 
and shadows.  My symbol is the death of light and the fl ame 
of death.  Sparks die in me only to be reborn as thunder and 
lightning.  Darkness itself glows in me.
  —Emil Cioran, On the Heights of Despair
Suicide is folded into French existentialism like butter into croissants.  For 
Jean-Paul Sartre, humans are “condemned to be free,” beings who “are 
not free to cease being free.” (1984 [1944], p. 439).  Why?  Because no 
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matter the harshness of circumstances, we always have suicide as an out.1 
In choosing not to complete suicide, we affi rm responsibility for every 
action because we could have chosen otherwise.  Suicide’s possibility 
upholds our agency and freedom.  Albert Camus intensifi ed this theme, 
writing: “There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is 
suicide” (1983 [1955], p. 3).2  After all, he explains, “… killing yourself 
amounts to confessing.  It is confessing that life is too much for you or 
that you do not understand it” (1983 [1955], p. 5).  For Camus, suicide 
is something we cannot ignore because it displays the absurdity of life 
and our reactions to it.  Hope, scorn, defi ance, whatever our alternative to 
suicide—meanings in life emerge after we contemplate suicide.3 Despite 
coming from the same philosophical tradition, Camus and Sartre do not 
agree about suicide.  Camus recommends against suicide.  Sartre keeps the 
option.  Camus argues based on meaning in life.  Sartre argues based on 
autonomy, freedom, and responsibility.
I argue that Emil Cioran, a contemporary of Sartre and Camus, 
resolves the confl ict between the two thinkers.  He disparages the act of 
suicide but promotes its contemplation.  He thus agrees with Sartre that it 
affects our agency, responsibility, and ability to consider existential issues. 
Yet he agrees with Camus that we should not kill ourselves.  Cioran did 
not change his mind about these ideas either.  Throughout his career, 
Cioran stands fi rmly against suicide (e.g. 1992 [1934], p. 55).4  Yet also 
throughout his career, he champions the importance of the idea of suicide, 
as when writing: “I live only because it is in my power to die when I 
choose to: without the idea of suicide, I’d have killed myself right away” 
(2012 [1952]).5
How can Cioran advocate for thinking about suicide while criticizing 
going through with it?  The key is how he characterizes human existence: 
meaningless and full of suffering.  But rather than euphemize that, he lays 
it bare.  Beginning his philosophical defense of life from bleakness, he 
offers a novel way of thinking about suicide: It is ultimately useless, but 
you become a better person by considering it.  I want to make sense of these 
claims, especially since Cioran’s aphorisms and essays fail to explicate 
these ideas clearly.  So, this paper aims, fi rst, to organize Cioran’s thoughts 
about suicide and, second, to examine whether his claim is true that we 
should contemplate suicide to make our lives go better.
1. Life Is Meaningless But So Is Suicide
What puzzles me about Cioran is the bleakness of his worldview yet 
his insistence against suicide.  He ends A Short History of Decay with, 
“Forever be accursed the star under which I was born, may no sky protect 
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it, let it crumble in space like a dust without honor!  And let the traitorous 
moment that cast me among the creatures be forever erased from the lists 
of Time” (2012 [1949], p. 180)!  He did not want to be born, and despite 
living eight decades, many with a life-long partner, he never changed his 
mind.  Life is suffering, and nothing can justify its torments (1992 [1934], 
p. 54).6  In fact, at one point Cioran defi nes life as “a state of non-suicide” 
(2012 [1949], p. 19 [emphasis in original]).  Yet here we are.7  And here, 
Cioran argues, we should not kill ourselves.
Cioran writes: “It is not worth the bother of killing yourself, since you 
always kill yourself too late” (2012 [1973], p. 32 [emphasis in original]). 
Also: “Why don’t I commit suicide?  Because I am as sick of death as I am 
of life” (1992 [1934], p. 56).  Cioran has moments as a poet waxing defi ant. 
He has moments as an arbiter, litigating on behalf of freedom.  But the 
central theme in his writings on suicide is this: everything is meaningless, 
and nothing you do can help, not even suicide.  If that is truly the verdict, 
there is no basis for preferring death to life.  He explains, “Only optimists 
commit suicide, the optimists who can no longer be … [sic] optimists. 
The others, having no reason to live, why should they have any to die” 
(2012 [1952])?  We muck about in a vacuum of meaninglessness, failed 
values sucking at our shoes like putrid mud.  By the time we consider 
suicide, we have already suffered immensely.  There is no way any action, 
even suicide, can justify this or make sense of life.  Additionally, by the 
point of suicidal ideation, we have seen every value falter.  As corollary, 
there is no value that can ground non-suffering as preferable to suffering.8 
So, there is nothing to gain from suicide.
We usually associate meaninglessness and hopelessness with 
desperation, anxiety, and misery.  Cioran would deny none of these 
associations.  But he would also ask why these things should push us 
toward suicide.  Putting aside the pretenses of meaning, aspiration, or 
positive values liberates us.  After all, Cioran writes, “In order to triumph 
over [death’s] appetite, there is but one ‘method’: to live [life] to the end, 
to submit to all its pleasures, all its pangs, to do nothing to elude it” (2012 
[1949], p. 12).  Many human frustrations lie in trying to fi nd something to 
cover the ugly truths that life has no obvious meaning and that we are all 
making things up.  Instead, Cioran recommends that we should face this 
realization and keep moving forward.
Cioran advances novel arguments against suicide.  He does not rely on 
the irrationality of using one’s capacity to will to never will again, nor does 
he rely on duties to one’s own or another’s dignity (cf. Kant, 1996, §6). 
Nor does he make religious appeals (cf. Augustine, 2003, I.20).  Rather, 
he takes the prospect of meaninglessness seriously.  He extrapolates that 
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under such conditions, suicide would be meaningless too, not to mention 
useless.  Killing oneself can accomplish no goal of the would-be suicide.9
2. The Virtues of Contemplating Suicide
Yet Cioran says he admires the suicidal.  Non-suicidal people have a self-
assurance and contentment that prevent radical change.  By contrast, the 
suicidal are acquainted with death and can kill every aspect of themselves, 
a prerequisite for metamorphosis.  Something about their dispositions 
allows them to transform themselves in ways that others cannot (1992 
[1934], p.  56).  Thinking everything through, they live more mindfully. 
Embracing their fi nitude, they are more realistic.
Given Cioran’s admiration of the suicidal, he laments that Christianity 
took away the serious everyday consideration of killing ourselves (2012 
[1973], p. 157).  The ancients, especially the Stoics, made an art of dying. 
They took control of death by contemplating it daily and setting forth plans 
to ensure a good one.  They did not cling to life because they cowered 
before death.  Nor did they avoid discussing the issue altogether, Stoics 
often laughing at the lash of a faux pas.  They considered all alternatives 
to their actions and life goals, and they lived and died better for it.  By 
contrast, when looking at people today, Cioran bemoans, “Habitués of 
despair, complacent corpses, we all outlive ourselves and die only to fulfi ll 
a futile formality.  It is as if our life were attached to itself only to postpone 
the moment when we could get rid of it” (2012 [1949], p. 39).  By not 
empowering ourselves through considering suicide, we enfeeble every 
aspect of ourselves.
But contemplating suicide does not mean obsession with it. 
Contemplation is optimal; obsession is glutted.  Cioran argues, “To be 
obsessed with suicide, there must be such inner agony that all self-imposed 
barriers break and nothing is left but catastrophic dizziness, a strange and 
powerful whirlwind” (1992 [1934], p. 55).  Obsession occurs whenever 
we refuse to spend time considering the positives of anguish and death. 
Like trying not to pay attention to a chronic, worsening ache, a person 
ends up letting his illness deteriorate, and adjusts every other aspect of 
his body to compensate.  In trying not to pay attention, he pays more than 
he would have.  Cioran writes, “The man who has not given himself up 
to the pleasures of anguish, who has not savored in his mind the dangers 
of his own extinction nor relished such cruel and sweet annihilations, will 
never be cured of the obsession with death: he will be tormented by it for 
he will have resisted it” (2012 [1949], p. 12).  In contrast, the person who 
understands death, especially at her own hands, can put the issue of death 
behind her and live resurrected.  Rather than die a million deaths anxiously 
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avoiding the topics of suicide and death, the wise person entertains the 
thought thoroughly enough to die once intellectually and to be reborn 
through further action.10  No one is freer than the dead, unencumbered by 
yesterday’s pacts and tomorrow’s obligations.  Cioran might say: live as 
if you are already dead, not because you recoil at the thought, but because 
you left the corpse of your life and its values behind.11
Perhaps most unique to Cioran, he offers hedonistic reasons for 
contemplating suicide.  He admits, “The notion of destroying ourselves, 
the multiplicity of means for doing so, their ease and their proximity 
delight us and fi ll us with dread; for there is nothing simpler and more 
terrible than the action by which we decide irrevocably upon ourselves” 
(1992 [1934], p. 36).  While we should never complete suicide, Cioran 
thinks that contemplating suicide is fair fun.  I cannot help but wonder 
what he would think of the movie Harold and Maude (1971), in which 
Harold routinely fakes his own suicide in theatrical ways and relishes 
the memories in therapy.  Or Andy Riley’s The Book of Bunny Suicides 
(2003), which has dozens of comics of rabbits killing themselves.  There 
is a perverse pleasure in experiencing these works, and if we could give 
up pretenses, maybe we could feel the same thinking of our own demise.
It is also worth stressing an entailment of Cioran’s hedonistic views 
on contemplating suicide: if we kill ourselves, we cannot experience the 
pleasure of contemplating our own suicides.  We know for certain that 
we can relish our own perverse visions here and now.  But if we died, we 
would lose that source of pleasure.  And we should not squander something 
so wonderful.
Contemplating suicide changes us.  It builds confi dence.  Cioran 
imagines a critic asking him where he gets his “superior airs.” He responds, 
“I’ve managed to survive, you see, all those nights when I wondered: am 
I going to kill myself at dawn” (2012 [1952]).  Surviving those nights, we 
get a little swagger.  The ability to intend our own deaths is uniquely human 
(2012 [1949], p. 38).12  And God, that pitiful all-perfect being, could never 
die by suicide.  Cioran writes, “In a single second we do away with all 
seconds; God himself could not do as much.  But, braggart demons, we 
postpone our end: how could we renounce the display of our freedom, the 
show of our pride?  … [sic]” (2012 [1949], p. 36).  Considering suicide sets 
us above animals, angels, and gods.  And, oddly, that distinction makes life 
more worth living.  Moreover, while the world may take everything from 
us, it can never take our freedom to kill ourselves.  There is a supreme 
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3. The Sense of Endings
Cioran’s remarks clearly indicate that he thinks the contemplation of 
suicide a necessary condition for living well.  Without considering suicide, 
we die unaware, indifferent, mechanical.  If we never consider the darker 
aspects of existence, we miss out on, perhaps, most of human life.  Cioran 
writes, “Life breeds both plentitude and void, exuberance and depression” 
(1992 [1934], p. 8).13 Enjoying the happy moments is easy.  But what 
about everything else?  I think Cioran offers equalizing advice: nothing 
matters, so do not take your own life too seriously.14  By taking it all in, 
and seeing how meaningless everything is, we can more accurately assess 
the experiential value of all things.  If we kill ourselves in thought and let 
our values ripen and rot, we move forward with fewer burdens.
Imagine you die.  Then imagine the gods grant you a single day in the 
land of the living.  Would you groan about any of your problems?  Would 
you kill yourself as soon as you breathed air again?  Cioran is betting 
no.  I am too.  And it is this perspective—savoring perverse pleasures and 
appreciating the elegant void—that I would recommend to strong minds. 
Life is suffering, but life ain’t serious enough to kill yourself over.
Emil Cioran, and maybe he alone, makes sense of the fact that the 
universe is large and indifferent to humanity.  But not just that.  I think he 
inspires us to consider that things could always get worse, even in an after 
life (if such a state exists).  Cioran also exposes the limits of reason.  The 
very capacity that we use to perceive order and justify existence might not 
be up to its tasks.  The uniqueness and complexity of the faculty of human 
reason does not entail its usefulness or value.  After all, hagfi sh produce a 
rare slime that can choke any predator to keep them from being eaten.  But 
even they must protect themselves from their defi ning characteristic, often 
by tying themselves in knots so that they do not choke on their own slime 
(see: Jensen, 1966).
We put weight on decrepit pretenses when we aspire to brute 
objectivity.  Why not give that up before the structure crumbles?  And 
when other things crumble, why think it matters so much we should kill 
ourselves?  For Cioran, not by not suiciding, we give ourselves immediate 
opportunities to enjoy dark thoughts, and we delay the coming horrors of 
inexistence.  We also avoid the atrocities of certainty, evidenced in any 
moral or political monstrosity.  This does not, of course, mean that we 
cannot aspire toward Truth or fi ght for Justice.  But it does mean that we 
will be humble enough to adapt to new data and adjust our strategies. 
No matter how grand our projects, we will always fail.  No matter how 
abysmal our failures, a peculiar and hilarious human diddles in the 
wreckage.  Thinking about suicide arms us with gallows humor.  If we 
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are all going to hang, we might as well enjoy twist of the rope and the 
carpentry of the platform.  Or, as Cioran wrote:
I must struggle against myself, fl y into a rage at my destiny, 
blow up all resistance to my transfi guration; let there be only 
my desire for light and darkness! Let each one of my actions 
be either triumph or fall, fl ight or failure! Let life grow and die 
in me with the speed of a lightning bolt! Let not the pettiness 
and rationality of commonplace existence spoil the pleasures 
and torments of my inner chaos, the tragic delights of my fi nal 
despair and joy! (1992 [1934], p. 106)15
Notes
 1 Sartre explains:
Thus there are no accidents in a life; a community event 
which suddenly bursts forth and involves me in it does not 
come from the outside.  If I am mobilized in a war, this 
war is my war; it is in my image and I deserve it.  I deserve 
it fi rst because I could always get out of it by suicide or 
by desertion; these ultimate possibilities are those which 
must always be present for us when there is a question of 
envisaging a situation.  For lack of getting out of it, I have 
chosen it.  (1984, p.  554 [emphasis in original]) 
 2 Camus puts the point starkly:
All the rest [of philosophical problems]—whether or not 
the world has three dimensions, whether the mind has nine 
or twelve categories—comes afterwards.  … I have never 
seen anyone die for the ontological argument.  … On the 
other hand, I see many people die because they judge that 
life is not worth living.  I see others paradoxically getting 
killed for the ideas or illusions that give them a reason for 
living (what is called a reason for living is also an excellent 
reason for dying).  (1983 [1954], pp. 3-4).
Of course, Camus here is connecting suicide to meaning in life.  But he recognizes 
that no such necessary connection exists (see: 1983 [1954], p. 8). 
 3 It is worth noting that positive emotions are not the only response to 
absurdity, somehow transcending absurdity via happiness.  Negative emotions 
also play a part.  Camus emphasizes, “There is no fate that cannot be surmounted 
by scorn” (1983 [1953], p. 121). 
 4 In this paper, I hope to make sense of Cioran’s written works on suicide. 
His life is more complicated, however.  In his old age, he began to suffer from 
Alzheimer’s.  So, he created a suicide pact with his partner Simone Boué to try to 
avoid dying in an institution.  Unfortunately, he did not avoid the fate he feared 
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(Bradatan, 2016).  Cioran’s life might show that, under certain circumstances, 
suicide is indeed justifi ed.  But I am unsure of how to square that position with his 
original works. 
 5 Cioran also writes: “We dread the future only when we are not sure we can 
kill ourselves when we want to” (2012 [1973], p. 77). 
 6 Cioran writes, “Docile to malediction, we exist only insofar as we suffer” 
(2012 [1949]), p. 28). 
 7 Such wretched conditions imply, for Cioran, that we should never 
procreate.  He writes, “To have committed every crime but that of being a father” 
(2012 [1973], p. 6).  Having children is akin to the worst crimes of existence. 
 8 Pessimism could go deeper.  For example, Walter Benjamin recounts a 
conversation that Max Brod told him about when talking with Franz Kafka.  Max 
Brod recounts, “I recall … a conversation with Kafka … ‘We are,’ so [Kafka] 
said, ‘nihilistic thoughts, suicidal thoughts that arise in God’s head.’  This fi rst 
reminded me of the worldview of the Gnostics: God as evil Demiurge, the world 
his fall into sin.  ‘Oh, no,’ [Kafka] said, ‘our world is only a bad mood for god, 
a bad day.’  So there might be hope outside of this world of appearances that we 
know?  [Brod asked.]  Kafka smiled, ‘Oh, hope enough, an unending amount of 
hope, only not for us.’” (1981, p. 14 [my own translation]).  In this case, Kafka 
voices something common in cosmic horror: the gods are wholly indifferent to 
us, and we are so trivial that we do not even register as a mistake, much less as 
something beloved.  Life is suffering, but no one really cares.
Similarly, David Hume begins Part X of Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion with a discussion of suffering.  The discussion is, perhaps, best 
summarized by Demea: “Were a stranger to drop on a sudden into this world, 
I would show him, as a specimen of its ills, a hospital full of diseases, a prison 
crowded with malefactors and debtors, a fi eld of battle strewed with carcases, 
a fl eet foundering in the ocean, a nation languishing under tyranny, famine, or 
pestilence.  To turn the gay side of life to him and give him a notion of its pleasures; 
whither should I conduct him?  to a ball, to an opera, to a court?  He might justly 
think that I was only showing him a diversity of distress and sorrow” (1998, p. 
61).  In other words, human capacities and affairs are a parade of suffering, and 
even leisure activities might join the precession, rather than offer an alternative. 
 9 There is one caveat.  Cioran seems to be a thoroughgoing subjectivist 
at times.  For example, he writes, “We should repeat to ourselves, every day: I 
am one of the billions dragging himself across the earth’s surface.  One, and no 
more.  This banality justifi es any conclusion, any behavior or action: debauchery, 
chastity, suicide, work, crime, sloth, or rebellion.  … [sic] Whence it follows that 
each man is right to do what he does” (2012 [1973], pp. 118-9).  But at other 
times, Cioran seems to defend adamantly that there are rights and wrongs, “‘Since 
for you there is no ultimate criterion nor irrevocable principle, and no god, what 
keeps you from committing any and every crime?’ ‘I fi nd in myself as much evil 
as in anyone, but detesting action—mother of all vices—I am the cause of no one’s 
suffering.  Harmless, without greed, and without enough energy or indecency 
to affront others, I leave the world as I found it.  To take revenge presupposes 
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a constant vigilance and a systematic mind, a costly continuity, whereas the 
indifference of forgiveness and contempt renders the hours pleasantly empty.  All 
ethics represent a danger for goodness; only negligence rescues.  Having chosen 
the phlegm of the imbecile and the apathy of the angel, I have excluded myself 
from actions and, since goodness is incompatible with life, I have decomposed 
myself in order to be good’” (2012 [1949], p. 156).  His condemnation of certainty 
and zealous action seem more than subjectivist opinions.  Lastly, this could give 
rise to yet another novel argument against suicide: actively choosing to end your 
own life would mean presupposing some ethic or set of values, which is the root 
of dangerous zeal that is the source of all the world’s ills.  It is much better to forgo 
action altogether, including an action like killing yourself. 
 10 Cioran’s advice about contemplating death rings of Epictetus: “Death, 
exile, everything appearing terrible, especially death—keep them in front of your 
eyes every day.  Then you will take nothing base to heart, nor set your heart on 
anything excessively” (1928, s. 21 [my own translation]).  The root of the words 
ἐνθυμηθήσῃ and ἐπιθυμήσεις is θυμός, which is more than “mind” or “thought,” 
as is traditionally translated.  There’s a deeper sense of spirit and desire, which 
I have rendered as “heart.”  Similarly, I think Cioran’s considerations are not 
merely cognitive.  Emotion and desire play large roles in his philosophy. 
 11 Marcus Aurelius gives similar advice: “Think of yourself as dead.  You 
have lived your life.  Now take what’s left and live it properly” (2003, p. 94). 
 12 Philosophers might dispute whether animals can kill themselves.  For 
example, Aristotle tells a story about a stallion who was tricked into mating with 
his own mother.  The stallion’s mother was a quality mare, and the child stallion 
did not want to mate with her.  But the owner covered the mother’s head in a 
wrapping, and the stallion mated with her.  After the cover was removed, the 
stallion ran away and jumped off a cliff to its death (Aristotle, 1984, IX.47). 
 13 Cioran shares this sentiment with Michel de Montaigne, who wrote, “We 
must learn to suffer whatever we cannot avoid.  Our life is composed, like the 
harmony of the world, of discords as well as of different tones, sweet and harsh, 
sharp and fl at, soft and loud.  If a musician liked only some of them, what could 
he sing?  He has got to know how to use all of them and blend them together.  So 
too must we with good and ill, which are of one substance with our life” (2003, p. 
1237). 
 14 I have understated how opposed Cioran was to seriousness.  He writes, 
“The devil pales beside the man who knows a truth, his truth … The real criminals 
are men who establish an orthodoxy on the religious or political level, men 
who distinguish between the faithful and schismatic” (2012 [1949], p. 4).  He 
also writes, “Courage and fear, two poles of the same disease, which consists 
in granting an abusive sense and seriousness to life.  … [sic] It is the lack of 
nonchalant bitterness which makes men into sectarian beasts; the subtlest and 
the crudest crimes are perpetuated by those who take things seriously.  Only the 
dilettante has no taste for blood, he alone is no scoundrel … [sic]” (2012 [1949], 
p. 72).  This position led Susan Sontag to criticize his philosophy as somewhat 
conservative, maintaining the status quo through scorn of political reformers 
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and praise of inaction.  But she also walks this criticism back because Cioran 
celebrates rebellion and lambasts aristocrats (1968, pp. 23-4). 
 15 I owe thanks to Avery Kolers and John Gibson for discussing the ideas 
in this paper with me, and for their encouragement in pursuing the ideas further. 
I also want to thank Thomas Tilton, MS, LPC, who drew my attention to 
terminology surrounding suicide.  “Commit suicide” is a phrase that rings too 
much of “committing crime,” thus stigmatizing suicide.  So, there are people who 
prefer more neutral terms such as “complete suicide” or “death by suicide.”  I 
tried to respect this where possible. 
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